La place de Turgot dans l’histoire de la pensée économique a été beaucoup discutée et les avis divergent. La tentation de le comparer à l’autre géant du siècle, Adam Smith, étant trop forte, il a été ou placé en-dessous, ou au-dessus de son rival écossais. La question de l’emprunt qu’aurait fait Smith des idées de Turgot est encore débattue de nos jours et en écrivant en 1903, Robert Perry Shepherd ne peut que s’étonner du ton très vindicatif des positions des uns et des autres sur ce point. Au-delà de cette dette éventuelle, il analyse dans ce chapitre, tiré d’un livre à paraître aux éditions de l’Institut Coppet, ce que la science économique doit à Turgot et où ce génie inclassable doit être positionné dans la grande lignée qui part de Boisguilbert et va jusqu’à Jean-Baptiste Say.
[sur les rapports entre Smith et Turgot, lire aussi sur notre site : Adam Smith a-t-il plagié Turgot ? Recension de la version française du livre d’Anne-Claire Hoyng]
THE PLACE OF TURGOT IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMICS
par Robert Perry Shepherd
(extrait de Turgot and the six Edicts, New York, 1903 ; à paraître prochainement aux éditions de l’Institut Coppet)
Outside academic circles, Turgot is not widely known. Embodying as he did many of the best characteristics of racial manhood and trustworthiness, he transcends national boundaries and would fill, with wholesome results, a far larger place in the public mind than has been accorded to him in the past.
To the economist, interest in Turgot centers in him as a factor in the economic interpretation of history, and in his contributions to the literature and facts of economic science. So much of his work had to do with permanent principles rather than with changeful social forms that the interpretation of his doctrines becomes most timely and helpful to the practical economist of the present; his economic theories are of like interest to the economic philosopher; while his relation to his contemporaries and to subsequent history and literature is of fundamental value both to the historian of economics and to the student of economic history.
Hitherto the interpretation of Turgot’s economic doctrines has been based largely on his Réflexions sur la Formation et la Distribution des Richesses, the first known attempt to separate for study these related economic phenomena. The controversy over Turgot and Adam Smith was waged chiefly over Smith’s knowledge and use of the Réflexions; it alone was counted worthy of translation in Lord Overstone’s list of rare and valuable economic treatises, and in Ashley’s edition of economic classics; Daire places it first in his arrangement of Turgot’s works, and it is unquestionably the best known and most discussed of all Turgot’s writings; it shares with his Éloge de Gournay the reputation of his best contributions to the literature of economics.
It is quite probable that no one would be more surprised than the author at the conspicuous place accorded to this bit of writing. In a letter to Dr. Tucker, written in September, 1770, Turgot says: “That bit was written for the instruction of two Chinese who are in our country and to make them comprehend more clearly some questions which I addressed to them concerning the economic condition and constitution of their empire.”  As an economic primer for foreigners whose minds were of necessity almost a blank concerning the topics of most absorbing interest in their strange surroundings, the Réflexions would serve an admirable purpose. And there is every reason to see why Turgot, who was almost continuously absent from Paris and busy with his work as Intendent in Limousin, would attempt to make these foreign youths acquainted with the doctrines of the Physiocrats, by whom they were surrounded in Paris, and to withhold from the instruction, in large measure, the points of radical difference between himself and the Physiocrats, and which could not well be elaborated within reasonable space, and especially for those whose minds were largely a blank on the economic topics so rife in Paris.
The primary purpose of the Réflexions was to equip the Chinese to impart information intelligibly, rather than to impart economic information to them. In a letter to Caillard, written in May, 1774, Turgot explains to his friend that in the proposed translation of the Réflexions into German, they ought properly to be introduced by a preface in which it should be stated that “the pamphlet was not intended for the public but to serve as a preamble to questions concerning the economic constitution of China, and addressed to two Chinese whom it was desired to put in condition to reply to the questions; and that that letter having been confided by the author to M. Du Pont, editor of the Éphémérides du Citoyen, he inserted it in his journal.”  In his letters to Du Pont, in 1770, published by Schelle and translated by Ashley, Turgot roundly scores Du Pont for presuming to edit the Réflexions before publishing them separately, and for making them read according to Du Pont’s ideas of what they ought to say rather than what was actually said; he repudiates some of the phrases and ideas added to the Réflexions by Du Pont, and insists that in the face of all their imperfections it is incumbent on a writer to be himself and not another.
Now if historical criticism in literature means anything, these facts ought to be given place in the interpretation of the Réflexions; they serve, partly at least, to account for the disparity in composition between the Réflexions and Turgot’s writings for maturer minds, and especially for the lack of the clarity characteristic of all his public documents. Turgot is by no means the only writer to obscure his meaning when attempting to be unusually simple and elementary. In another letter to Caillard, dated March 16, 1770, Turgot asks that his manuscript of Réflexions be sent to him, for, said he, “There is on page 96 of the December issue of the Éphémérides a phrase which I find to be obscure and unintelligible. I suspect that two or three lines are omitted, and I am unable to supply them.” It would be a most valuable textual find if this manuscript could be produced.
Early in his career he turned his attention to economic investigation, and his essay written to a fellow-student as an outgrowth of a conversation, on paper money, is of more than passing interest. At some time, probably during the period of his labors as a magistrate, he wrote a carefully reasoned essay on Value and Money. This essay, of which but a fragment is preserved, demonstrates both his logical methods of reasoning and his conclusions at that time concerning that fundamental phase of economics. The Six Edicts, including the preambles and the defense of them against the criticisms of Keeper of the Seals, M. Hue Miroménil, are his last contributions of importance to the literature of the science. In the twenty-seven years intervening between his first attempts at economic discussion and his last, he found time to compose many comprehensive treatises on different subjects, but those on economic topics are by far the most important and of most permanent interest.
In the interpretation of his doctrines and theories, it is especially interesting to note how admirably they illustrate the cycle in which human events and conditions are wont to move. With all the changes in economic relations, new systems and new industrial principles, it is not without surprise that one finds many of Turgot’s arguments timely and pertinent to present conditions. One paragraph in the report of the Anthracite Arbitration Commission, reads almost like a quotation from Turgot’s argument on the suppression of the jurandes, and it is not altogether without significance that conditions which demanded the iteration of principles then demand reiteration of the same laws now.
Another fact must be borne in mind in the interpretation of Turgot’s economic doctrines, and that fact is of such a nature that it renders that interpretation vastly more difficult than would be the case if Turgot had been a mere publicist, elaborating his doctrines with scholarly exactness, and leaving a printed record of his thought. He did this, but he did more. In a very unique and real sense, his whole life was devoted to the elucidation of economic principles. In his mind, clearly enough, political and social evils, and many religious ones too, were directly traceable to false economic doctrines embodied in the laws or administrative execution of them. To him, reason was the fundamental fact of economic interpretation and application. His appeal by voice and pen, and public effort was to reason. He thought he discerned in economic privileges the insulation on either side of which the potentials were accumulating so rapidly and powerfully that, if contact were not soon established and the interplay of forces directed along safe lines, an explosion must come which might involve the obliteration of the insulation and much besides. Precisely for the purpose of penetrating this dead wall of economic privileges, the Six Edicts were promulgated. The well-studied purposes and well-tried principles of which they were the concrete embodiments will be discussed later; it is sufficient for the present to note that Turgot gave his life with full abandon to the elaboration of these principles, and that the interpretation of his doctrines requires much more than mere literary criticism, for his writings were but the sparks struck out from the fire burning within the man, and his deeds are of equal importance with his executive documents.
Turgot’s place in the history of economics has been variously construed in later times, from Leon Say’s verdict that “he is the founder of our present political economy, and, by the freedom of labor which he bequeathed us, he has stamped our century with its most distinctive mark”, to Oncken’s opposite opinion wherein he assigns Turgot a distinctively subordinate place. The final judgment is yet to be made. Some misconceptions may be banished by a more general knowledge of all of Turgot’s economic activities; some may be made to appear wholly untenable by assembling known facts of his relations with other economists, while others may never be resolved. Of the first class is his relation to the physiocrats.
This relationship is somewhat complicated because of the disagreement between Turgot and his biographers and the English and German economists. It is unquestioned that Turgot held warmly to some of the doctrines of the Physiocrats; the readiness and lucidity with which he set forth these doctrines in the Éloge of Gournay shows not only familiarity but sympathy with them. With scarcely an exception, the writers who have occasion to refer to Turgot class him with the Physiocrats, and the more exact ones place him in the Gournay school rather than in that of Quesnay. Léon Say flatly declares that Turgot remained a Physiocrat until the end of his days.  Higgs, on the other hand, while including Turgot among the Physiocrats whom he discusses, acknowledges that Turgot always refused to identify himself with that school. The whole question must be decided according to whatever basis of division and classification one chooses for himself. Over against all that may be said by others of Turgot, his own words ought to be placed as partly, if not chiefly determinative. Du Pont states that he very frequently said: “It is the sect spirit that makes enemies to useful truths. If an independent man states modestly what he believes to be the truth, if Reason be with him, we listen to him; if we find him in the wrong, we forget him. But as soon as savants surrender themselves, in pride, to constitute a body and to say ‘we’, and believe themselves able to give laws to public opinion, thoughtful public opinion revolts against them, wishing to receive laws from truth only and not from authority.” 
Turgot left no comprehensive reasoned statement of his economic theories. The Éloge makes it clear that he held with Gournay to the principles of free labor, free industry, and free trade in grain; his essay on Valeurs et Monnaies, a fragment only of which is preserved to us, if indeed it ever was a finished production, shows his agreement with Galiani in tracing value to a psychological basis, finding it a phenomenon peculiar to man and not in nature outside man himself. He frankly acknowledges himself in hearty agreement with Trudaine both as to the nature and incidence of taxation; he tries to establish a distribution of value according to reason, justice and equity, but scarcely mentions the Tableau Œconomique which the followers of Quesnay regarded with almost superstitious reverence. He held, in common with all the Physiocrats, that land alone yielded a net product over and above the labor and capital expended upon it, but Turgot held these positions not as a physiocrat, nor did he accept them because they were cardinal tenets of a school; on the contrary, with a striking individualism, what he held he first passed with rigorous independence through his own mind, and accepted his own reason and conscience as final. And these are not the characteristics of a partisan. While he was admired by all his friends among the philosophes and économistes, he, in turn, venerated Quesnay, honored Mirabeau, tolerated and criticized Galiani, and sincerely loved Gournay and Trudaine. It was natural for them to claim him as one of their school, and equally natural for him to hold aloof from all societies in proportion as they were capable of binding or determining his intellectual or moral positions. This course could have no other effect than to weaken his hold upon that great class of minds which yield allegiance more readily to institutions than to ideas. He would think for himself, and persuade others to his thought if he could. And such men are not easily classified and identified with sects and schools.
Turgot’s relations with Adam Smith have been discussed with all the fervor of personal interest and heated chauvinism. The controversy has almost passed out of the impassioned stage, and yet here again it is plain that the last word has not been said. To the orthodox economists of France, Turgot holds the same place that Adam Smith does to English and American economists; priority of doctrine, and Smith’s possible indebtedness to the Physiocrats and Turgot, have been vigorously discussed in three languages. Interest in the discussion had about disappeared entirely, largely because the old material had been so well worked over that little remained to be said, when Cannan published, in 1896, some hitherto unknown data, and by his own historical and critical introduction to the work gave the subject a new lease of life, and kindled into warm glow the embers of forgotten fires.
The new material was in the form of elaborate notes of Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence, covering the topics Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms. The lectures were delivered at the University of Glasgow some time before Smith resigned his professional duties in 1763, and later than 1760. They forecast in great part his subsequent monumental work on the Wealth of Nations. Cannan has given painstaking care to the comparative analysis of the two works. His introduction contains an admirable summary of the present status of the controversy, from one point of view. We take the liberty of quoting here rather freely from the passage relevant to our theme. Of Smith and Turgot, Cannan says:
“Du Pont de Nemours said, in his haste, of the Wealth of Nations, ‘everything that is true in this respectable but tedious work in two fat quarto volumes is to be found in Turgot’s Reflections on the Formation and Distribution of Riches; everything added by Adam Smith is inaccurate, not to say incorrect.’ At a later period he repented of this outbreak, and confessed to a certain want of knowledge of the English tongue which had prevented him from appreciating Smith’s work as he ought to have done. But down to quite recent times, if not to the present day, writers of authority have often expressed belief that Wealth of Nations owes much to Turgot’s Reflections. Du Pont’s learned and able biographer, as lately as 1888, permitted himself to speak of ‘the care with which’ Adam Smith ‘omits to quote’ the principal works of the physiocrats and ‘especially that of Turgot.’
“For the particular accusation, indeed, that Adam Smith does not acknowledge his obligations to Turgot, there never was much foundation. He certainly does not acknowledge obligations; but had he any to acknowledge? Turgot’s book, though written in 1766, was only published six years before the Wealth of Nations, and then only in the French periodical Éphémérides du Citoyen. As this was not in the Advocates Library at Edinburgh in 1776, and is not among the collections of Adam Smith’s books which Dr. James Bonar has catalogued, we are not justified in assuming that Adam Smith had so much as seen the work. The internal evidence is of the weakest possible character. To rely on general similarities of doctrine in such a case is childish. Such similarities are constantly found in the writings of contemporary authors who can not possibly have been acquainted with each other’s works. The coincidence is to be explained by the fact that in literature, as in everything else, the same effects produce the same causes (sic). There is surely nothing surprising in the fact that two men who have read the same books and observed the same events, should occasionally use the same arguments and arrive at the same conclusions. Something much more definite is needed, and no serious attempt has ever been made to supply it, by pointing out particular passages in Wealth of Nations which appear to owe anything to the Réflexions.
“Myths of this kind, however, die hard, and if the lectures had remained unknown, the statement that Adam Smith made much use of the Réflexions would probably have been repeated from text-book to text-book for at least another half-century. But as it now appears that the resemblance between the Réflexions and the Lectures is just as close as that between the Réflexions and the Wealth of Nations, and as the Réflexions were not even written till after Adam Smith had ceased lecturing and had seen and conversed with Turgot, it may be supposed that the enthusiasts of plagiarism will now seek to show that instead of Smith stealing from Turgot, the truth was that Turgot stole from Smith.” 
To those who have neither inherited nor acquired a personal, party, or national interest in this controversy, the vigor and earnestness of Cannan’s observations are somewhat puzzling, and one is led to question if his zeal has not played sorry tricks with his memory. Familiar as he is with Bonar’s Catalogue of Adam Smith’s library, he must know that Bonar states unequivocally that he catalogued not more than two-thirds of the books in Smith’s library before it was divided among his heirs, and that if McCulloch’s estimate of the number of books in the library be at all accurate, the catalogue only contains two-fifths of them. At any rate, with one-third of the books omitted, no valid conclusion can be drawn concerning the books Smith did not have. And Cannan must also have known of the intimacy existing between Hume, Smith and Turgot, for the correspondence between Hume and Turgot as grouped and published by Ashley was published in Burton’s Hume, in the Letters of David Hume by Hill, and in Anderson’s translation of Léon Say’s Turgot. More than three years before the Réflexions were published letters of familiar intercourse passed freely between them; and although Rae stoutly affirms that in the absence of records from either side of the channel there could have been no correspondence between Smith and Turgot, both Neymarck and Condorcet speak of it. Furthermore, it is known that Turgot and Hume corresponded during 1770; that in September of the same year Turgot sent a copy of the Réflexions to Dr. Tucker, and that at least one copy of the Réflexions, bound separately, was in England, and in the possession of one of Smith’s friends, six years before the Wealth of Nations appeared. It must be presumed, also, that Cannan forgot that in the same letter to Dr. Tucker, Turgot mentions his astonishment that “in a country enjoying the liberty of the press you are almost the only author who recognizes and understands the advantages of free trade, and who is not led astray by the puerile and sanguinary delusion of a self-centered exclusive commerce”; that in March of 1778, less than two years after the publication of Wealth of Nations, Turgot writes to Dr. Price of “the system of monopoly and exclusion which controls in all your political writers on matters of trade (I except M. Adam Smith and Dean Tucker), the system which is the active principle of separation between you and your colonies.”  These letters of Turgot are translated in the work on Turgot by Stephens, and published a year before the Notes. These evidences, taken in connection with the known intimacy between the men and their kindred interests, seem to justify a directly opposite conclusion from that drawn by Cannan, that “we are not justified in assuming that Adam Smith had so much as seen the work.”
Again, in stating that “no serious attempt has even been made to supply it, by pointing out particular passages in Wealth of Nations which appear to owe anything to the Réflexions”, Mr. Cannan seems to have forgotten the really serious and successful attempt to do that very thing by Dr. Leser in 1874. And overlooking Dr. Leser’s work, the Introduction to the Notes missed many valuable references which the author makes to the passages mentioned here, and many others of equal value. But in the elaborate and numerous parallelisms compiled by Dr. Leser, and those which may yet be made in re-examining Adam Smith’s work for the purpose of tracing his independent or borrowed Physiocracy, the “enthusiasts of plagiarism” may prove nothing definite, for it is improbable that any more palpable evidences of “unconscious cerebration” may be discovered than that which is apparent between Cannan’s own words, quoted herein, and the language of Rae in his life of Adam Smith, pages 203 and 204, concerning this same “Turgot myth”, and it is wholly unwarrantable to assume that Cannan is indebted to Rae.
Further, in concluding that “the resemblance between the Réflexions and the Lectures is just as close as that between the Réflexions and the Wealth of Nations”, Cannan is in direct and striking conflict of judgment with Hasbach who is no less friendly to Adam Smith than is Cannan. In his discussion of the evidence given by the Notes, Hasbach says, “For the gaping chasm between the Lectures and the Wealth of Nations there is no other explanation than that Smith, while associating with the Physiocrats, was led by a study of their works to assume a more friendly attitude toward Locke and Hutcheson, and thus gradually to oppose the views of Montesquieu.” 
A careful reading of the Notes does indeed disclose striking similarity between Smith’s conceptions of the nature, scope, and function of political economy as contained in the two works. Before Smith visited France he assigns political economy to a subordinate division of Police which he makes a subdivision of Jurisprudence. In the Wealth of Nations this position is maintained clearly in the Introduction to book IV. Throughout his writings, Smith seems to have conceived of political economy as essentially political, a sort of guide and hand book to the legislator. This conception he certainly did not get from the Physiocrats nor from Turgot, nor does he seem to have changed in this respect from his meeting with them, and his better knowledge of their works. Hasbach questions if Smith was not rather harmed than helped by his contact with Physiocratic doctrines, by losing in a measure the “historical objectivity” which characterized his earlier work, and Ashley thinks Smith acquired some ideas and nomenclature from them which he was unable to use in the way they used it. 
The fact must not be lost sight of that Smith was essentially a theologian of the “natural school”, a moral philosopher by training and profession; that his approach to economics was wholly from the side of morals and that his lectures on Natural Theology, Moral Sentiments and Jurisprudence were parts of a comprehensive course in Moral Philosophy.  Hasbach says: “The Lectures show us in a most unambiguous way that Adam Smith worked from 1760 to 1764 entirely within the limits of the Scotch moral philosophy; he had not yet at that time undertaken to separate the science of law from that of economic conditions.”  It seems rather that he never undertook to separate economic conditions, nor even conceived that they were separable, from the science of law. His place in the history of economics is established and unshakable and there is no ground for dispute over the value of the work to which he gave initial impetus. But it is altogether a question if his place in the science of economics is not rather the result of fortuitous circumstances than of inherent merit as an economist. As between Smith and Turgot in this field there is no comparison between the men, but rather marked contrast. As Dr. Seligman has pointed out, “to Turgot we owe the first analysis of modern distribution into wages, profits and rent; to Turgot we owe the discussion of the distribution of labor, and the nature and employment of capital; in Turgot we find the iron law of wages, the great arguments against the corn laws, the overthrow of the guild system, some of the fundamental principles of taxation, and a host of other doctrines.”  And not only is the quantity of economic doctrines incomparably greater in Turgot than in Smith, but the quality of their respective works, their fundamental conceptions of economic relations, their construction of economic phenomena and analysis of economic laws, their perspicacity of economic insight and lucidity of expression are radically different, and with the advantage all in favor of Turgot. Both, indeed, had gained the historical perspective required for the interpretation of the present, but here again their methods were in sharp contrast; Smith was essentially expository and illustrative, Turgot was critical and constructive; Smith was an instructor, never separate from his didactic methods, Turgot was ever appealing to reason and conscience. Smith sought what had been found serviceable in producing opulence, while Turgot ceased not to appeal to the sense of justice in man, in behalf of what ought to be, regardless of what had been.
And their view-point as economists was equally at variance. Smith’s position has already been defined. Turgot would posit reason as the sole determinative factor in construing economic relations. Had he been confronted with the phenomenon of industrial capital as it exists today, together with the obvious sources of income found in industrial processes, he would have been quick to renounce the fallacy of regarding agriculture as the sole agent of a produit net. All his writings warrant the assertion that under changing social conditions and continuous industrial readjustments, Turgot stood open to change and modification of his views, in so far as these were not based “in the nature of things”. And in coming to his theoretical and practical conclusions, there is nothing in Turgot to match the indefiniteness of generalization, vague definitions and “squinting constructions” of economic doctrine which are so characteristic of Smith. Hasbach, in the essay already quoted, says that “Smith grafted a physiocratic economic branch on the tree of his metaphysics”. Any unprejudiced reader of the Wealth of Nations who is at all qualified to form independent judgments, feels consciously when perusing book I, chapter V, and book II, chapters I and II, where Adam Smith comes nearer propounding a theory of distribution than anywhere else in the work, that he rather tied to the branches of his metaphysical tree some economic fruit, with the flavor of which he was unfamiliar.
The Notes make it clear that neither Turgot nor the Physiocrats had any part in communicating to Adam Smith his doctrines of the division of labor, and of Natural Law and Liberty. Whatever he says of this in the Wealth of Nations he got from sources outside France. But what little there is in his doctrines on the distribution of value he must have gotten from some source, and that doctrine was the one specialty above all others of Quesnay and his school, as well a favorite topic with Turgot.
Events in England, however, were ripening for the industrial revolution. Almost coincident with the appearance of the Wealth of Nations came the revolutionary’ economic fact discovered and applied by Smith’s erstwhile fellow professor in the university. The Wealth of Nations, written under the domestic system and of most use in that environment, was destined to become the book of reference and inspiration for the economic schools and literature of the factory system; the name of Adam Smith quickly became a household term. The fact that the Wealth of Nations was scientifically inexact and capable of many different interpretations made it all the better adapted to general and promiscuous discussion. Adam Smith sprang at once into prominence and enduring fame among economists and with the public. His place is assured and indisputable, and his work is beyond disparagement because of what it accomplished and inspired others to do.
Meanwhile events in France were ripening to an economic revolution, which produced so much social fire and political smoke that the man who, more than all others, discerned the true nature of the swiftly approaching revolution and devoted his life with sublime unreserve to avert it was obscured to most of the world outside of France for more than a century. When Turgot was dismissed from the Ministry of the King, he was held in dishonor by most of his own nation. He had a circle of friends who held him in highest esteem and appreciated his efforts for France. It is not yet fifteen years since the first account of his life and doctrines appeared in English. Little of his work was published during his life time, and the works in English concerning him, though good, are but fragmentary at best. The twenty months during which he was Controller-General of Finance are among the best known periods of French history; but, outside academic circles, his wider fame and richly-deserved recognition are but in process of being established.
 Daire, Œuvres de Turgot, vol. II, p. 802.
 Daire, Œuvres de Turgot, vol. II, p. 832.
 Schelle, Du Pont de Nemours et l’École Physiocratique, pp. 26, 128.
 Ashley, Economic Classics, Turgot, p. viii.
 Daire, Œuvres de Turgot, vol. II, p. 811.
 Anthracite Arbitration Commission Report. The paragraph reads: “The right and liberty to pursue a lawful calling and to lead a peaceable life, free from all molestation or attack, concern the comfort and happiness of all men, and the denial of them means the destruction of one of the greatest, if not the greatest, of the benefits which the social organization confers. This all seems too plain for argument… Our language is the language of a free people, and fails to furnish any form of speech by which the right of a citizen to work when he pleases, for whom he pleases, and on what terms he pleases, can be successfully denied.” March, 1903.
 Léon Say, Turgot, p. 13.
 Oncken, Geschichte der Nationalökonomie in Hand- und Lehrbuch der Staatswissenschaften, 2 Band, I. Teil, pp. 449, 459, 463.
 Léon Say, Turgot, p. 62.
 Dupont, Œuvres de Turgot, pp. 47 ff.
 Soulavie, Mémoires Historiques et Politiques du Règne de Louis XVI., t. II, p. 277.
 Cannan, Notes of Lectures by Adam Smith, Intro., pp. 23 ff.
 Bonar, Catalogue of Adam Smith’s Library, p. viii.
 Ashley, Economic Classics, pp. 101 ff.
 Burton, Hume, pp. 350 ff.
 Hill, Letters of David Hume, p. 87.
 Léon Say, Turgot, p. 56.
 Rae, Life of Adam Smith, p. 204.
 Neymarck, Turgot et ses Doctrines, vol. II, p. 332.
 Condorcet, Vie de Turgot, p. 201.
 Daire, Œuvres de Turgot, p. 802.
 Ibid, pp. 805 ff.
 Leser, Begriff des Reichtums bei Adam Smith, pp. 79-92, and note 2, p. 86.
 Hashach, “Adam Smith’s Lectures”, in Political Science Quarterly, vol. XII, p. 692. (For this latter conclusion see also Puynode, Études, p. 48.)
 Cannan, Notes of Lectures by Adam Smith, pp. 154, 157.
 Hasbach, “Adam Smith’s Lectures”, in P. S. Q., vol. XII, p. 695.
 Ashley, Economic Classics, p. xiii.
 Leslie, Essays, p. 25.
 Hasbach, “Adam Smith’s Lectures”, in Political Science Quarterly, vol. XII, p. 685.
 Seligmin, “Review of Léon Say’s Turgot”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. IV, p. 180.